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Abstract
Clark’s completion is a simple nonmonotonic formalism and a special case of several non-
monotonic logics. Recently there has been work on extending completion with “loop formulas” so
that general cases of nonmonotonic logics such as logic programs (under the answer set seman-
tics) and McCain–Turner causal logic can be characterized by propositional logic in the form of
“completion + loop formulas”. In this paper, we show that the idea is applicable to McCarthy’s cir-
cumscription in the propositional case, with Lifschitz’s pointwise circumscription playing the role
of completion. We also show how to embed propositional circumscription in logic programs and in
causal logic, inspired by the uniform characterization of “completion + loop formulas”.
 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Nonmonotonic reasoning; Commonsense reasoning; Knowledge representation; Circumscription;
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1. Introduction
Clark’s predicate completion [5] is a simple and intuitive nonmonotonic formalism.
Normally it is applicable when the knowledge base is given as a set of rules, and works
when the rules do not yield a “cycle”.
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solve many problems that were thought to require more sophisticated nonmonotonic logics.
For instance, Reiter [34] showed that under certain reasonable assumptions, successor state
axioms can be computed from action effect axioms by predicate completion, and thus
solved the frame problem when there are no state constraints. For state constraints, Lin
[25] argued that they should be encoded using a notion of causality, and once they are
encoded this way, successor state axioms can once again be computed using predicate
completion for a class of causal rules that includes almost all of the benchmark planning
domains [25,27].
For the “definite” fragment of McCain–Turner causal logic [10,28], the problem of de-
termining whether a theory is consistent can be reduced to the satisfiability problem for
propositional logic by the process of “literal completion”—a translation similar to Clark’s
completion. This idea has led to the creation of the Causal Calculator (CCALC),1 a system
for representing commonsense knowledge about action and change. After turning a definite
causal theory into a classical propositional theory, CCALC finds the models of the latter
by invoking a satisfiability solver, such as CHAFF,2 SATO3 and RELSAT,4 which in turn
correspond to the models of the given causal theory. CCALC has been successfully applied
to several challenge problems in the theory of commonsense knowledge [1,4,18,23] and to
the formalization of multi-agent computational systems [2,3].
In logic programming where predicate completion is best known and commonly re-
ferred to as program completion semantics, its relationships with other semantics, espe-
cially the answer set semantics (also known as the stable model semantics) of Gelfond
and Lifschitz [9], have been studied quite extensively. First of all, it is well known that an
answer set for a normal logic program is also a model of its completion, while the con-
verse, generally, does not hold. Fages [8] showed that a certain syntactic condition, which
is now called “tightness”, is sufficient for establishing the equivalence between them. Er-
dem and Lifschitz [7] generalized Fages’ theorem and extended it to programs with nested
expressions (in the sense of [17]) in the bodies of rules.
Instead of looking for conditions that will guarantee the equivalence between the com-
pletion semantics and the answer set semantics, Lin and Zhao [24] considered how to
strengthen completion to make it equivalent to the answer set semantics. The idea is that,
since the presence of cycles is what causes the mismatch between the models of the com-
pletion and the answer sets for a program, one should address the problem raised by them
directly. The completion semantics captures the intuition that for an atom to be true, one
of the bodies of the rules with the atom as the head must be true. Similarly, Lin and Zhao
associated with each loop a “loop formula” that captures the intuition that for the atoms in
a loop to be true, there must be a rule whose head belongs to the loop, and whose body
is true but its positive part does not have any atom in the loop. They showed that a set of
atoms is an answer set for a nondisjunctive logic program iff it is a model of the completion
and all loop formulas of the program. This idea allows SAT solvers to be used for finding
1 http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/tag/ccalc/.
2 http://www.ee.princeton.edu/~chaff/.
3 http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~hzhang/sato.html.
4 http://www.almaden.ibm.com/cs/people/bayardo/resources.html.
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and CMODELS-2 [11].
As it turned out, program completion and loop formulas are not limited to nondisjunc-
tive logic programs. Lee and Lifschitz [12] extended the Lin/Zhao theorem to disjunc-
tive logic programs and, more generally, to arbitrary programs with nested expressions.
Lee [13] showed that a similar result can be obtained for McCain and Turner causal logic
and based on this, showed how to embed logic programs in causal logic.
Given these results, one wonders how far this idea of “completion + loop formulas”
can go. Is it general enough to capture other nonmonotonic logics? In this paper, we an-
swer this question positively for circumscription [29,30] in the propositional case. Thus it
is interesting to observe that these apparently different nonmonotonic formalisms have a
uniform view of “completion + loop formulas”. Using this idea, we show how to embed
circumscription in logic programs and in McCain–Turner causal logic.
Hopefully, these results will lead to good implementations of propositional circumscrip-
tion using SAT solvers and/or answer set solvers. This would be a significant progress in
nonmonotonic reasoning as circumscription has found applications in commonsense rea-
soning, model-based diagnoses, discourse understanding, and others. While many of these
applications in general make use of first-order circumscription, they can be solved using
propositional circumscription when their domains are given and finite.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some notations that we
will use in the rest of the paper, and recast the definition of circumscription in the propo-
sitional case. In Section 3, we discuss Clark’s completion, and compare it with Lifschitz’s
pointwise circumscription [20], as the latter will serve as “completion” for our purpose. In
Section 4, we introduce the notion of a loop via the notion of a dependency graph. Section 5
contains the main technical results of the paper, which shows that circumscription can be
characterized by completion plus loop formulas. It also discusses some related work. Based
on the results in Section 5, Section 6 shows how circumscription can be embedded in logic
programs under the answer set semantics and in McCain–Turner causal logic. We conclude
in Section 7.
2. Logical preliminaries
A literal is a (propositional) atom or the negation of an atom. A (propositional) formula
is formed from literals using propositional connectives. A clause is a finite set of literals.
We identify a clause C with the disjunction of its elements. It is well known that any
formula can be transformed into an equivalent set of clauses.
We use variables that range over 0-place connectives  and ⊥, and quantify over
them. For instance, if A(z,p1, . . . , pk) is a propositional formula built with propo-
sitional variables z,p1, . . . , pk , we write ∀zA(z,p1, . . . , pk) to denote the formula
A(,p1, . . . , pk) ∧ A(⊥,p1, . . . , pk), and similarly ∃zA(z,p1, . . . , pk) to denote the for-
mula A(,p1, . . . , pk)∨A(⊥,p1, . . . , pk).
In the following, we sometimes write a formula A as A(P ) or A(P,Q) for tuples P and
Q of atoms. This way, when X is a tuple of variables and atoms of the same length as P ,
we use A(X) or A(X,Q) to denote the result of simultaneously replacing all elements
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corresponding set when there is no confusion.
For P = (p1, . . . , pn), Q = (q1, . . . , qn),
P Q stands for
∧
1in
(pi ⊃ qi),
P = Q stands for
∧
1in
(pi ≡ qi),
P < Q stands for (P Q)∧ ¬(P = Q).
Let P and Z be tuples of atoms, and A(P,Z) a formula. The circumscription of P in
A(P,Z) with atoms in Z allowed to vary, is the following formula:
A(P,Z) ∧ ¬∃XY (A(X,Y ) ∧X < P ). (1)
The formula is denoted by CIRC[A(P,Z);P ;Z], which may also be written as
CIRC[A(P );P ] when Z is empty.
The second conjunct of formula (1) is actually a propositional formula as in the follow-
ing example:
CIRC[p ∨ q;p] = (p ∨ q)∧ ¬∃x((x ∨ q)∧ (x ⊃ p)∧ (x 
≡ p))
= (p ∨ q)∧ ¬[(( ∨ q)∧ ( ⊃ p)∧ ( 
≡ p))
∨ ((⊥ ∨ q)∧ (⊥ ⊃ p)∧ (⊥ 
≡ p))]
≡ (p ∨ q)∧ ¬(p ∧ q). (2)
The models of the circumscription are {p} and {q}.5
There is a weaker notion of circumscription that will turn out to be important here. This
is Lifschitz’s pointwise circumscription [20]. In the propositional case, given an atom p
and a tuple Z of atoms, the pointwise circumscription of p in A(p,Z) with Z allowed to
vary is
A(p,Z)∧ ¬∃xY (A(x,Y ) ∧ x < p), (3)
and the pointwise circumscription of a tuple P of atoms in A with Z allowed to vary is the
conjunction of the pointwise circumscription of each p ∈ P in A with Z allowed to vary.
It can be seen that (3) is equivalent to CIRC[A;p;Z]. Thus the pointwise circumscription
of a tuple P of atoms in A with Z allowed to vary is
∧
p∈P CIRC[A;p;Z].
For two interpretations (i.e., truth assignments) I , J of the same signature, we write
I P ;Z J 6 if
• I and J agree on all atoms that are not in P and Z, and
• for each pi in P , if pi ∈ I then pi ∈ J .
We write I <P ;Z J if I P ;Z J but not J P ;Z I .
5 We identify an interpretation with the set of atoms that are true in it.
6 We may even write I P J when Z is empty.
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of circumscription.
Proposition 1. An interpretation I is a model of CIRC[A;P ;Z] iff it is minimal7 on P
with Z allowed to vary, that is,
• I is a model of A, and
• there is no model J of A such that J <P ;Z I .
For example, among the three models of p∨q , {p,q} is not a model of CIRC[p∨q;p]
because {q} <p {p,q}.
3. Completion and pointwise circumscription
Clark’s completion turns “if” conditions into “if and only if” conditions. For instance,
given the following rules about Wet,
Raining ⊃ Wet
SprinklerOn ⊃ Wet,
Clark’s completion, when applied to Wet, yields
Wet ≡ Raining ∨ SprinklerOn.
The underlying assumption here is what has been called the closed world assumption [32]:
the given knowledge base contains complete knowledge about what can make Wet true.
In particular, if there is no rule about a proposition, say p, then it is assumed to be false:
p ≡ ⊥.
In general, we have the following definition.
Definition 1. Let A be a set of formulas of the form G ⊃ p where G is a formula and p is an
atom, and suppose that the following are the only implications in A with the consequent q:
G1 ⊃ q, . . . ,Gn ⊃ q . Then Clark’s completion of A on q is q ≡ G1 ∨ · · · ∨ Gn. Notice
that when n = 0, this is q ≡ ⊥. For a set P of atoms, Clark’s completion of A on P is the
conjunction of Clark’s completions of A on p, for all p ∈ P .
Logically, Clark’s completion on q is equivalent to adding to A the sentence q ⊃ G1 ∨
· · · ∨ Gn, i.e., making the weakest sufficient condition of q also its necessary condition.
Unfortunately, Clark’s completion is not quite fit here for the following reasons. One
problem is that it is defined for formulas of the form G ⊃ p, rather than for arbitrary for-
mulas. Thus Clark’s completion can be compared with circumscription only when formulas
are given in this special form. Moreover, Clark’s completion is sensitive to the syntactic
form of the given knowledge base. For instance, while ¬p ⊃ q and ¬q ⊃ p are logically
equivalent, their Clark’s completions on {p,q} are not.
7 Recall Footnote 5.
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scription [20], that generalizes Clark’s completion, and is syntax independent. To see this,
notice first that, as we have mentioned above, Clark’s completion on p essentially turns a
“weakest” sufficient condition of p into its necessary condition. Formally, we can define
the notion of weakest sufficient conditions as follows [26].
Given a propositional formula A and an atom q , a formula ϕ that does not mention q is
called a weakest sufficient condition of q if
• A  ϕ ⊃ q , and
• for any other formula ψ such that it does not mention q and A  ψ ⊃ q , we have that
A ψ ⊃ ϕ.
For any A and q , weakest sufficient conditions of q always exist and are unique up to
logical equivalence under A. In the following, given a formula A and a set P of atoms, we
use AP⊥ to denote the result of replacing all occurrences of atoms from P in A by ⊥. In
this section, P will always be a singleton.
Proposition 2 [26]. For any formula A and any atom q , the formula ¬A{q}⊥ is a weakest
sufficient condition of q .
Thus we could extend Clark’s completion to arbitrary formulas as follows: Given any
formula A and any set P of atoms, the generalized Clark’s completion of A on P is the
conjunction of A and formulas p ⊃ ¬A{p}⊥ for all p ∈ P . As it turned out, this is exactly
Lifschitz’s pointwise circumscription of P in A.
Proposition 3. For any formula A and any atom q , CIRC[A;q] is equivalent to A ∧ (q ⊃
¬A{q}⊥ ).
Proof. ¬∃x(A(x)∧ x < q) is equivalent to
¬[(A() ∧  < q)∨ (A(⊥)∧ ⊥ < q)],
which is equivalent to
¬[(A() ∧ q ∧ ¬q)∨ (A(⊥)∧ q)],
which is equivalent to q ⊃ ¬A{q}⊥ . 
So in the following, we shall use the term “completion” and “pointwise circumscription”
interchangeably, and for our purpose here, we also call the pointwise circumscription of P
in A with Z allowed to vary, the completion of A on P with Z allowed to vary.
The following proposition shows that the completion of A is equivalent to Clark’s com-
pletion of B for some B that is equivalent to A.
Proposition 4. Let A be a formula, and P the set of atoms in it. There is a formula B of
the required form in the definition of Clark’s completion such that A is equivalent to B ,
and the completion of A on P is equivalent to Clark’s completion of B on P .
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q ∈ P , each clause that contains q , say G ∨ q , generate the rule ¬G ⊃ q , and let B be the
resulting theory. Clearly B is equivalent to B0, thus to A as well. Clark’s completion of B
on P is the conjunction of B and q ⊃ ¬B{q}⊥ for all q ∈ P . But B is equivalent to A, and
B
{q}
⊥ is equivalent to A
{q}
⊥ . So the proposition follows. 
Lifschitz [20] showed that circumscription always entails pointwise circumscription
(completion), but the converse does not hold in general. For instance, CIRC[p ≡ q;p,q]
yields ¬p ∧ ¬q . But the pointwise circumscription of (p, q) in p ≡ q is equivalent to
p ≡ q . The reason is that pointwise circumscription (completion), like Clark’s completion,
does not handle “loops”, such as the one between p and q in the formula p ≡ q . The main
purpose of this paper is to formally define what we mean by loops in a formula, associate
a constraint with each loop, and show that propositional circumscription is equivalent to
the conjunction of pointwise circumscription and the constraints for all loops. We begin
by defining the notion of a loop. Like in logic programs, we appeal to the notion of a
dependency graph.
4. Dependency graphs and loops
A clause like p ∨ q ∨ ¬r can be rewritten as (r ∧ ¬q) ⊃ p or (r ∧ ¬p) ⊃ q . So if one
wants to count ways an atom can be “derived”, this clause needs to be counted for both p
and q . In general, if a clause C contains an atom p, then it can be rewritten as ¬(C\{p}) ⊃
p.8 This motivates the following definition of a dependency graph of a set of clauses.
Definition 2. Let A be a set of clauses, and P a set of atoms. The (positive) dependency
graph of A on P is the directed graph such that
• the vertices are the atoms in P , and
• an edge goes from vertex p to vertex q if there is a clause C in A such that p,¬q ∈ C.
A nonempty subset L of P is called a loop of A on P if, for every pair p, q of atoms
in L, there exists a path of non-zero length from p to q in the dependency graph of A on P
such that all vertices in this path belong to L. For example, consider the following set A1
of clauses:
{p ∨ ¬q, ¬p ∨ q, r ∨ ¬s, ¬r ∨ s, p ∨ r}.
This theory has two loops on {p,q, r, s}, {p,q} and {r, s}, as shown by its dependency
graph in Fig. 1.
We can make the definition of a loop slightly more general by dropping the requirement
that the paths be of non-zero length. That is, a nonempty subset L of P is called a gener-
alized loop of A on P if, for every pair p, q of atoms in L, there exists a path from p to q
8 Recall that ¬(C\{p}) is equal to ∧l∈C\{p} l¯ where l¯ denotes a literal complementary to l, according to the
convention of identifying a clause with the disjunction of its literals.
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in the dependency graph of A on P such that all vertices in this path belong to L. In other
words, a nonempty subset L of P is a generalized loop of A on P if the subgraph of the
dependency graph of A on P induced by L is strongly connected. Note that a singleton
subset {p} of P is a loop if and only if there is an edge from p to itself in the dependency
graph. On the other hand, every singleton subset of atoms is a generalized loop, regard-
less of the presence of such edges. For instance, in addition to the loops that we found
before, A1 has four other generalized loops on {p,q, r, s}: {p}, {q}, {r}, {s}. As we will
see later, the notion of a generalized loop simplifies the statements of many of our results
such as Theorem 1 below. It will also allow us to view loop formulas as a generalization of
completion.
For an arbitrary formula A, its dependency graph can be defined by considering a set B
of clauses that is equivalent to A:
Definition 3. Given a formula A, if B is a finite set of clauses that is equivalent to A,
then the dependency graph of B on P is called the dependency graph of A on P under B .
Similarly, the loops of B on P are called the loops of A on P under B , and the generalized
loops of B on P are called the generalized loops of A on P under B .
5. Computing the models of propositional circumscription
We begin with the simple case when there are no constants (atoms) allowed to vary.
5.1. The basic case
Recall that for any formula A and any set P of atoms, by AP⊥ we denote the result of
replacing all occurrences of atoms from P in A by ⊥.
Theorem 1. Let A be a formula, and B a finite set of clauses that is equivalent to A. The
following formulas are equivalent to each other.
(a) CIRC[A;P ].
(b) The conjunction of A and
∨
K ⊃ ¬AK⊥ 9
for all subsets K of P .
9 When
∨
is applied to a set K as in the antecedent, it stands for the disjunction of all elements of K . ∧ is
similar.
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∧
L ⊃ ¬AL⊥ (4)
for all generalized loops L of A on P under B .
In view of the theorem, circumscribing a theory can be regarded as just adding to it
formulas (4) for all generalized loops. When L is a loop, we call formula (4) the conjunctive
loop formula of L for CIRC[A;P ]. Notice that (c) can also be viewed as the conjunction
of the completion of A on P and all conjunctive loop formulas.
Since conditions (b) and (c) are equivalent to each other, any intermediate condition
between the two is also equivalent to (a)–(c):
Corollary 1. The following formulas are equivalent to each of formulas (a)–(c) of Theo-
rem 1.
(d) The conjunction of A and
∧
K ⊃ ¬AK⊥
for all nonempty subsets K of P .
(e) The conjunction of A and
∨
L ⊃ ¬AL⊥ (5)
for all generalized loops L of A on P under B .
Note that in (d), K should be nonempty. Otherwise, the formula is unsatisfiable. When
L is a loop, we call formula (5) the disjunctive loop formula of L for CIRC[A;P ]. Note
also that (4) and (5) are the same when L is a singleton. The two formulas can be different
only when L is a loop.
Another corollary of Theorem 1 is when the theory has no loops:
Corollary 2. For any formula A, if there is an equivalent set B of clauses such that there
are no loops of B on P , then CIRC[A;P ] is equivalent to the completion of A on P .
Corollary 2 is more general than Proposition 3 in that P is not required to be a singleton.
We can still compute circumscription by completion if there are no loops. For instance,
CIRC[p ∨ q;p,q] is equivalent to the completion of p ∨ q on {p,q}. On the other hand,
Corollary 2 does not apply even when P is a singleton if B has a loop. However, such a
loop can only come from a tautological clause, which can be dropped without affecting the
models. After then Proposition 3 follows from Corollary 2.
For an example theory that has loops, consider the theory A1 and the tuple P =
(p, q, r, s) in the previous section. This theory has three models, {p,q}, {r, s} and
{p,q, r, s}, among which the last is not a model of CIRC[A1;P ] because {p,q} <P
{p,q, r, s}. Theorem 1 tells us that the models of the circumscription can be found by
computing the models of the completion and loop formulas. As we have seen in the pre-
vious section, there are two loops of A1 on P , {p,q} and {r, s}. Their loop formulas are
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on P , {p,q, r, s} does not satisfy loop formula p∧q ⊃ ¬r (or r ∧ s ⊃ ¬p), so that it is not
a model of CIRC[A1;P ]. The other two satisfy all loop formulas, and thus are the models
of the circumscription.
The view of circumscription in terms of “completion+ loop formulas” sometimes helps
us observe why two circumscriptions are equivalent to each other. For instance in the ex-
ample above, even if we restrict atoms to be circumscribed in to be only {p,q}, the result
remains the same. The completion of A1 on {p,q} is a subset of the completion of A1 on P ,
so that all three models of A1 still satisfy the completion of A1 on {p,q}. Set {p,q, r, s}
still does not satisfy loop formula p ∧ q ⊃ ¬r for CIRC[A1;p,q], which is also a loop
formula for CIRC[A1;P ].
According to Theorem 1, to compute the circumscription of P in A with all other atoms
fixed,
(1) one first converts A into a finite set B of clauses,
(2) constructs the dependency graph of B on P ,
(3) finds the loops of the dependency graph, and then
(4) computes loop formulas.
In the first step, a formula may be equivalent to many different sets of clauses, which in
turn may yield different dependency graphs. (For instance, formulas
{p ∨ q ∨ ¬r, p ∨ ¬q ∨ ¬r, ¬p ∨ ¬q ∨ r, ¬p ∨ ¬q ∨ ¬r}
and
{p ∨ ¬r, ¬p ∨ ¬q}
are equivalent to each other, but their dependency graphs on {p,q, r} are different.) For
our purpose, everything else being equal, the fewer loops that a dependency graph has the
better. We believe that in general, given a formula A, it is computationally hard to find an
equivalent set of clauses that would yield the smallest number of loops. But we do not have
a proof, and it remains an open question.
A standard way of converting a formula A (assuming all connectives other than ¬, ∧,
∨ are eliminated) into an equivalent set of clauses is first to distribute ¬ over ∧ and ∨ until
it applies to atoms only, and then to distribute ∨ over ∧ until it applies to literals only.
However, when distributing ∨ over ∧, the size of the formula could grow exponentially in
the number of atoms in A. To avoid the problem, one can introduce new atoms. We will
see in Section 5.2 that these new atoms can be treated similarly to atoms that are allowed
to vary.
Once converted into an equivalent set B of clauses (without introducing new atoms),
its dependency graph can be constructed in time polynomial to the number of atoms in A.
However, the number of loops can be exponential in the worst case. From the complexity
point of view, we cannot do much better about this as it turned out inevitable assuming
a conjecture from the theory of computational complexity which is widely believed to
be true. Lifschitz and Razborov [16] showed that any equivalent translation from logic
programs to propositional formulas involves a significant increase in size assuming the
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Lifschitz, personal communication).
One can also construct a dependency graph directly without actually generating a set
of clauses. Given a formula A, NNF(A) denotes the negation normal form of A, that is,
a formula obtained from A by distributing ¬ over ∧ and ∨ until it applies to atoms only.
Every formula A can be written in the form C1 ∧ · · · ∧ Cn (n 1) where each Ci is not a
conjunction. We call each Ci conjunctive component of A.
Definition 4. Let A be a formula, and P a set of atoms. The (positive) dependency graph
of A on P is the directed graph such that
• the vertices are the atoms in P , and
• an edge goes from vertex p to vertex q if there is a subformula F ∨ G of some con-
junctive component of NNF(A) such that p occurs in F and ¬q occurs in G, or the
other way around.
Theorem 1 still holds if we replace “for all generalized loops L of A on P under B”
with “for all generalized loops L of A on P ” under this definition. This is justified by the
following lemma:10
Lemma 1. Let A be a formula in negation normal form. There exists an equivalent set B of
clauses such that two literals l1, l2 belong to the same clause in B iff there is a subformula
F ∨G of A such that l1 ∈ F and l2 ∈ G, or the other way around.
Proof. This can be proved by structural induction. 
When we are given a set of clauses rather than an arbitrary formula to circumscribe in,
Theorem 1 may yield a shorter reformulation of circumscription:
Corollary 3. For any finite set A of clauses, CIRC[A;P ] is equivalent to the conjunction
of A and
∧
L ⊃
∨
C∈A
C∩L
=∅, C∩L=∅
¬(C\L)
for all generalized loops L of A on P .
Proof. Note first that for every clause C such that C ∩ L = ∅, CL⊥ is equivalent to C\L.
By Theorem 1, it is sufficient to show that every model of A does not satisfy ¬CL⊥ such
that C ∩L 
= ∅ or C ∩L = ∅:
• For every clause C in A such that C ∩ L 
= ∅, CL⊥ is a tautology, so that ¬CL⊥ is
unsatisfiable.
10 The lemma is due to Paolo Ferraris.
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which satisfies C, does not satisfy ¬CL⊥. 
5.2. Varying constants
The following proposition [19, Proposition 2] shows how to eliminate varied constants
in general:
Proposition 5. CIRC[A(P,Z);P ;Z] is equivalent to
A(P,Z) ∧ CIRC[∃zA(P, z);P ].
Thus circumscription with varied constants reduces to the basic case to which Theo-
rem 1 applies: we consider the dependency graph of ∃zA(P, z).
Alternatively, we can generalize the definitions of a dependency graph and a loop. Intu-
itively, paths are allowed to have varied atoms and their negations as intermediate vertices.
Given a set X of literals, X is the set of literals complementary to literals in X.
Definition 5. Let A be a set of clauses, and P , Z be sets of atoms. The (positive) depen-
dency graph of A on P with Z varied is the directed graph such that
• the vertices are the literals in P ∪Z ∪Z, and
• an edge goes from vertex l1 to vertex l2 if there is a clause C in A such that l1, l¯2 ∈ C.
The definition is a generalization of Definition 2 in that it reduces to Definition 2 when Z
is empty. Similarly to Definition 3, we can also extend Definition 5 to an arbitrary formula
by referring to an equivalent set of clauses.
Let L0 be the set of literals such that, for every pair l1, l2 of literals in L0, there exists a
path of non-zero length from l1 to l2 in the dependency graph of A on P with Z allowed
to vary such that all vertices in this path belong to L0. A nonempty set L = L0\(Z ∪ Z)
is called a loop of A on P with Z allowed to vary. A generalized loop of A on P with
Z allowed to vary is defined similarly to the case when no atoms are allowed to vary, by
dropping the requirement that the paths be of non-zero length.
For example, A2 is the set of clauses
{p ⊃ ¬z, ¬z ⊃ q, q ⊃ p},
and its dependency graph on {p,q} with {z} allowed to vary is shown in Fig. 2. There are
three generalized loops: {p}, {q}, {p,q}, and only the last one is a loop.
Fig. 2. The dependency graph of A2 on {p,q} with {z} varied.
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economical in terms of the number of loops we get. Given a set A of clauses and a tuple of
atoms Z = (zn, . . . , z1), Ak (0 k  n) is defined as follows:
• A0 = A,
• Ak = Ak−1 ∪ {C1 ∪C2: C1 ∪ {zk},C2 ∪ {¬zk} ∈ Ak−1}.
The Z-collapsed set of A is obtained from An by removing clauses C such that C
contains a pair of complementary literals, or there is a proper subset C′ of C such that
C′ ∈ An.
Let AZ be the Z-collapsed set of A, and A′Z the set of clauses in AZ that do not mention
atoms in Z. We could then define the loops and the generalized loops of A on P with Z
allowed to vary to be the loops and the generalized loops of A′Z on P . A loop (generalized
loop, respectively) according to this alternative definition is also a loop (generalized loop,
respectively) according to the definition above, but not vice versa. The following result
holds under either definition.
Theorem 2. Let A(P,Z) be a formula, and B a finite set of clauses equivalent to A(P,Z).
The following formulas are equivalent to each other.
(a) CIRC[A(P,Z);P ;Z].
(b) The conjunction of A(P,Z) and
∨
K ⊃ ∀z¬A(P, z)K⊥
for all subsets K of P .
(c) The conjunction of A(P,Z) and
∧
L ⊃ ∀z¬A(P, z)L⊥ (6)
for all generalized loops L of A(P,Z) on P under B with Z varied.
When L is a loop, we call formula (6) the conjunctive loop formula of L for
CIRC[A(P,Z);P ;Z].
Theorem 2 follows from Theorem 1, Proposition 5 and the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let A(P,Z) be a finite set of clauses. Formula ∃zA(P, z) is equivalent to the
set of all clauses in the Z-collapsed set of A that do not mention atoms in Z.
Similarly to Theorem 1, we have the following corollary to Theorem 2.
Corollary 4. The following formulas are equivalent to each of formulas (a)–(c) of Theo-
rem 2.
(d) The conjunction of A(P,Z) and
∧
K ⊃ ∀z¬A(P, z)K⊥
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(e) The conjunction of A(P,Z) and
∨
L ⊃ ∀z¬A(P, z)L⊥
for all generalized loops L of A on P under B with Z varied.
When L is a loop, we call formula (6) the disjunctive loop formula of L for
CIRC[A(P,Z);P ;Z]. We can again divide each of (c) and (e) into two parts: comple-
tion and loop formulas. Recall that the completion of a formula A(P,Z) on P with Z
allowed to vary is defined to be the pointwise circumscription of P in A with Z allowed to
vary, which is equivalent to the conjunction of A(P,Z) and formulas
p ⊃ ∀z¬A(P, z){p}⊥
for all atoms p in P .
Similarly to Corollary 2, we get the following corollary to Theorem 2:
Corollary 5. For any formula A, if there is an equivalent set B of clauses such that there
are no loops of A on P under B with Z varied, then CIRC[A;P ;Z] is equivalent to the
completion of A on P with Z varied.
In Section 5.1 we mentioned the use of new atoms to avoid exponential blow-up in
converting a formula into a conjunctive normal form. Here is one standard way to do so:
CLAUSIFY*(F ,Γ )
if F is a conjunction of clauses C1 ∧ · · · ∧Ck , then exit with {C1, . . . ,Ck} ∪ Γ ;
G := a minimal non-literal subformula of F ;
u := a new atom;
F := the result of replacing G in F by u;
CLAUSIFY*(F,Γ ∪ CLAUSIFY(u ≡ G)).
(CLAUSIFY(F ) returns a set of clauses equivalent to F by the method described in Sec-
tion 5.1.)
Let A(P,Z) be a formula and A′(P,Z,S) the result of CLAUSIFY*(A(P,Z),∅) which
introduces a set S of new atoms. Then A(P,Z) is equivalent to ∃sA′(P,Z, s). According
to Proposition 5,
CIRC
[
A(P,Z);P ;Z]≡ CIRC[∃sA′(P,Z, s);P ;Z]
≡ ∃sA′(P,Z, s) ∧ CIRC[∃zsA′(P, z, s);P ].
So it is sufficient to find the loops of the dependency graph of ∃zsA′(P, z, s). By Lemma 2,
we can consider the dependency graph of (Z ∪ S)-collapsed set of A′(P,Z,S) that do not
mention atoms in Z ∪ S.
Similarly to Definition 4, we can also define a dependency graph and a loop of an
arbitrary formula, without referring to an equivalent set of clauses.
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graph of A on P with Z varied is the directed graph such that
• the vertices are the literals in P ∪Z ∪Z, and
• an edge goes from vertex l1 to vertex l2 if there is a subformula F ∨ G of some con-
junctive component of NNF(A) such that l1 occurs in F and l¯2 occurs in G, or the
other way around.
Once we define a dependency graph, the definition of a loop is the same as before.
Theorem 2 still holds if we replace “for all generalized loops L of A(P,Z) on P under B”
with “for all generalized loops L of A(P,Z) on P ” under this definition.
Similarly to Corollary 3, when we are given a set of clauses rather than an arbitrary for-
mula to circumscribe in, Theorem 2 may yield a shorter reformulation of circumscription:
Corollary 6. For any finite set A of clauses, CIRC[A;P ;Z] is equivalent to the conjunc-
tion of A and
∧
L ⊃ ∀z
∨
C∈A, C∩L=∅
¬(C\L)
for all generalized loops L of A on P with Z varied.
Note that unlike Corollary 3 we do not restrict the disjunction to be over C ∩ L 
= ∅.
Indeed, if we did, the statement of the corollary would become incorrect. Consider a set A3
of clauses
{¬p ∨ q,¬q ∨ p,¬r ∨ s,¬s ∨ q}.
Set {p,q, r, s} is one of the models of CIRC[A3;p,q; s], but it does not satisfy the modi-
fied (wrong) loop formula, p ∧ q ⊃ ⊥.
Proof of Corollary 6. Note first that for every clause C such that C ∩ L = ∅, CL⊥ is
equivalent to C\L. By Theorem 2, it is sufficient to show that every model of A does not
satisfy ¬CL⊥ such that C ∩ L 
= ∅: for every clause C in A such that C ∩ L 
= ∅, CL⊥ is a
tautology, so that ¬CL⊥ is unsatisfiable. 
5.3. Relating to some known results
Reiter [33] was the first one to show some relationships between Clark’s predicate com-
pletion and circumscription. He proved that if a theory is Horn in a predicate P , then the
circumscription of P logically entails the completion on P . In the propositional case, our
new contributions are as follows. We showed that Lifschitz’s pointwise circumscription
extends Clark’s completion to arbitrary theories, not just those that are Horn. With this
extension of completion, we gave a general syntactic condition that guarantees the equiv-
alence between circumscription and completion. Also, we defined notions of loops and
loop formulas, and showed that circumscription can be reduced to “completion + loop
J. Lee, F. Lin / Artificial Intelligence 170 (2006) 160–185 175formulas” like answer sets in logic programming but with completion here defined to be
pointwise circumscription.
Traditionally, computing circumscription means finding classes of first-order theories
for which their circumscriptions are equivalent to first-order theories (e.g., [6,19,20]). In
the propositional case, circumscription is always equivalent to a propositional theory. So
the problem in the propositional case is not whether circumscription can be reduced to
propositional logic, but how economically this can be done.
In logic programming, when the positive dependency graph of a program has no loops,
the program is called “tight”, and the answer sets for a tight program are exactly the models
of the completion. Corollaries 2 and 5 in this paper address a similar syntactic condition
for circumscription in the propositional case. In the following, we show that some of the
known results about circumscription can easily be explained by our corollaries.
We say that an occurrence of an atom in a formula is positive if it is in the range of
an even number of negations, and negative otherwise (assuming that ⊃ and ≡ have been
eliminated in favor of other connectives). A formula A is positive relative to P if all occur-
rences of P in it are positive, and negative if all occurrences of P are negative. We see that
if A is positive (or negative) relative to P , then there is an equivalent set of clauses whose
dependency graph on P has no loops, so that CIRC[A;P ] is equivalent to the completion
of A on P . The result can also be extended when some atoms are allowed to vary. The
following proposition, which is from the propositional case of Proposition 2a from [20], is
easy to prove.
Proposition 6. For any tuple of atoms P = (p1, . . . , pn) and any formula A that is positive
relative to each pi , CIRC[A;P ;Z] is equivalent to the completion of A on P with Z
allowed to vary.
Proof. This follows from the fact that there exists a set of clauses equivalent to A such
that the dependency graph of A under it has no loops. 
Note that Corollary 5 provides a more general syntactic condition for the equivalence
between circumscription and pointwise circumscription, than the one in Proposition 6. For
example, consider CIRC[(p ⊃ q) ∧ (q ⊃ r);q, r]. The formula has no loops, and conse-
quently the circumscription is equivalent to its corresponding pointwise circumscription
by Corollary 5. But the conjunction in the formula cannot be divided into two parts so that
q , r are positive in one part and negative in the other, so Proposition 6 does not apply.
Sometimes it is easy to observe that the dependency graphs of some circumscriptions
have the same loops. For instance, this observation provides an easy proof of the following
proposition from [20].
Proposition 7. For any formula A and B , if B is negative relative to a tuple P of atoms,
then CIRC[A∧B;P ] is equivalent to CIRC[A;P ] ∧B .
Proof. There exists a set B ′ of clauses which is equivalent to B and is negative relative
to P . Notice that A ∧ B ′ and A have the same dependency graph on P , hence have the
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to each other when we notice that (B ′)L⊥ for any loop L is entailed by B ′. 
However, if some atoms are allowed to vary, then A ∧ B may have more loops than A
(A2(P, z) in Section 5.2 with B = {p ⊃ ¬z} for example), and B may not be “factored
out”.
6. Embedding circumscription in other nonmonotonic logics
As mentioned in the introduction, the idea of “completion + loop formulas” has been
applied to logic programs [12,24] and to McCain–Turner causal logic [13]. The charac-
terizations of these nonmonotonic logics in terms of propositional logic are useful tools
for comparing these formalisms. Based on this idea, Lee [13] showed how to embed logic
programs in causal logic.
Inspired by a similar characterization for circumscription, we show how to embed
circumscription in logic programs and in causal logic. The propositions are proved in Ap-
pendix A by turning each formalism into equivalent propositional formulas, and then show
that the translations are equivalent to each other (in propositional logic).
6.1. Embedding circumscription in disjunctive logic programs
For the semantics of disjunctive logic programs, we refer the reader to Section 5.1
of [21].
For a literal l, by lnot we denote not l if l is positive, and l¯ otherwise. Let A be a finite set
of clauses, and P a tuple of atoms. For each clause C ∈ A, the corresponding rule RP (C)
is
;
p∈C∩P
p ← ,
q∈C\P
qnot.
For example, R(p,q,r)(p ∨ q ∨ ¬r ∨ s) = p ;q ← r, not s.
By σA we denote the set of all atoms that occur in A.
Proposition 8. For any finite set A of clauses, a set of atoms is a model of CIRC[A;P ] iff
it is an answer set for logic program
{
RP (C): C ∈ A
}∪ {a ;not a: a ∈ σA\P
}
.
We can also embed circumscription with varied constants in logic programs. Given a
finite set A of clauses, let AZ be the Z-collapsed set of A. Program ΠA;P ;Z consists of the
following rules:
• RP (C) for all clauses C in AZ that do not mention atoms in Z,
• ← ,
p∈Cpnot for all other clauses C in AZ ,• a ;not a for all atoms a ∈ σA\P .
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iff it is an answer set for logic program ΠA;P ;Z .
For example, CIRC[A1;p,q, r] can be turned into:
p ← q
q ← p
r ← s
← r, not s
p ; r ←
s ;not s ←
As in the example, the translation gives us disjunctive programs in general. Thus one could
implement circumscription in logic programming systems like DLV11 and GnT12 using
Propositions 8 and 9.13
6.2. Embedding circumscription in causal logic
The semantics of McCain–Turner causal logic is given in [28].
Let A be a finite set of clauses, and P a tuple of atoms. For each clause C ∈ A, the
corresponding causal rule CRP (C) is
C ∩ (P ∪ P)⇐¬(C\(P ∪ P)).
By σA we denote the set of all atoms that occur in A.
Proposition 10. For any finite set A of clauses, an interpretation is a model of CIRC[A;P ]
iff it is a model of causal theory
{
CRP (C): C ∈ A
}∪ {¬a⇐¬a: a ∈ σA} ∪ {a⇐ a: a ∈ σA\P }.
whose signature is σA.
Proposition 10 is similar to the propositional case of Proposition 1 of [22].
Extending the result to circumscription with varied constants is similar to the case with
logic programs. Given a finite set A of clauses, let AZ be the Z-collapsed set of A. Causal
theory CTA;P ;Z consists of the following causal rules:
• CRP (C) for all clauses C in AZ that do not mention atoms in Z,
• ⇐ ¬C for all other clauses C in AZ ,
11 http://www.dbai.tuwien.ac.at/proj/dlv/.
12 http://www.tcs.hut.fi/Software/gnt/.
13 Strictly speaking, the current versions of these systems do not allow negation as failure in the head of a rule,
so it cannot handle such a rule as a; not a. However, there is a well-known technique to “simulate” rules of this
kind using additional atoms.
178 J. Lee, F. Lin / Artificial Intelligence 170 (2006) 160–185• ¬a⇐ ¬a for all atoms a ∈ σA,
• a⇐ a for all atoms a ∈ σA\P .
Proposition 11. For any finite set A of clauses, an interpretation is a model of
CIRC[A;P ;Z] iff it is a model of causal theory CTA;P ;Z whose signature is σA.
7. Conclusion
To recast, the following are our main contributions (all in the propositional case):
• Showed that pointwise circumscription is an extension of Clark’s completion from
Horn clauses to arbitrary formulas.
• Introduced a notion of a dependency graph for a finite set of clauses, and based on it,
notions of loops and loop formulas.
• Showed that circumscription is equivalent to completion (pointwise circumscription)
plus loop formulas, and based on this result, showed how to embed circumscription in
other nonmonotonic logics which have similar characterizations.
These results are of both theoretical interest and practical importance. A major obstacle in
implementing a reasoning system for propositional circumscription is that checking if an
assignment is a model of a circumscription is NP-hard. In comparison, checking if an as-
signment is a model of a formula in propositional logic or an answer set for a nondisjunctive
logic program can be done efficiently. According to Theorems 1 and 2, if a given formula
has no loops or has only a polynomial number of loops and these loops can be computed in
polynomial time, then checking if an assignment is a model of circumscription can be done
in polynomial time as well. Hopefully, many applications of circumscription will belong
to this class, just as many logic programs for practical problems are “tight” or “tight on the
models of completion”.
For future work, there is a need to better understand how loops can be computed. More
importantly, there is a need to extend the results of this paper to the first-order case.
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The proof of the main theorem is based on the following fact and the main lemma below.
Fact 1. For any formula A and any sets I , K of atoms,
I AK⊥ iff I\K A.
Proof. The proof is immediate by structural induction. 
Main Lemma. Let A be a formula, B a finite set of clauses equivalent to A, I a model
of A, P a set of atoms, and K a nonempty subset of P . If I does not satisfy AL⊥ for any
generalized loop L of A on P under B such that L ⊆ K , then I does not satisfy AK⊥ .
The proof is given in Section A.2.
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1. Let A be a formula, and B a finite set of clauses that is equivalent to A. The
following formulas are equivalent to each other.
(a) CIRC[A;P ].
(b) The conjunction of A and
∨
K ⊃ ¬AK⊥
for all subsets K of P .
(c) The conjunction of A and
∧
L ⊃ ¬AL⊥
for all generalized loops L of A on P under B .
Proof. From (b) to (c) is clear.
From (a) to (b): Let I be a model of CIRC[A;P ]. Let K be any subset of P such that
I ∩K 
= ∅. Since I\K <P I , it follows that I\K A. By Fact 1, it follows that I AK⊥ .
From (c) to (a): Let I be a model of the conjunction of A and
∧
L ⊃ ¬AL⊥
for all generalized loops L of A on P under B . Let J be any set of atoms such that J <P I .
We will show that J  A. Let K = I\J . For every generalized loop L that is contained
in K , since I 
∧
L, we have that I AL⊥. Since K is nonempty and I AL⊥ for any gen-
eralized loop L that is contained in K , by the main lemma, it follows that I AK⊥ , which is
equivalent to I\K A, i.e., J A by Fact 1. Therefore I is a model of CIRC[A;P ]. 
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Lemma 3. Let A be a formula, B a finite set of clauses equivalent to A, I a model of A, P a
set of atoms, K a subset of P , and L a nonempty subset of K . Suppose that the dependency
graph of B has no edge from an atom in L to an atom in K\L. If I AL⊥, then I AK⊥ .
Proof. We prove it for the special case when A = B . The general case follows because
when A and B are equivalent to each other, AL⊥ is equivalent to BL⊥ for any set L of atoms.
Assume that I AL⊥. There exists a clause C of A such that I  CL⊥, or by Fact 1,
I\L  C. (A.1)
For this C, we will show that I  CK⊥ , from which it follows that I AK⊥ .
Since I A,
I  C (A.2)
also. From (A.1) and (A.2), it follows that C contains at least one positive occurrence of
an atom from L. On the other hand, since the dependency graph of A has no edge from an
atom in L to an atom in K\L, C does not contain any negative occurrence of atoms from
K\L. Then it follows from (A.1),
I\K  C,
which is equivalent to I  CK⊥ by Fact 1. 
Proof of the Main Lemma. In view of Lemma 3, it is sufficient to show that there exists
a generalized loop L in K such that the dependency graph of B does not have any edge
from an atom in L to an atom in K\L. To see that there is indeed such a generalized loop,
let G be the subgraph of the dependency graph of A which is induced by K , and let G′
be the graph obtained from G by collapsing strongly connected components of G, i.e., the
vertices of G′ are the strongly connected components of G and G′ has an edge from a
vertex V to a vertex V ′ iff G has an edge from an atom in V to an atom in V ′. Since K is
nonempty, there is at least one generalized loop in K . Consequently, there is at least one
vertex in G′. From the fact that the vertices of G′ are the strongly connected components
of G, it follows that there is a terminal vertex in G′. Let L be that vertex. It is clear that
there is no edge from an atom in L to an atom in K\L in the dependency graph of B . 
A.3. Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2. Let A(P,Z) be a finite set of clauses. Formula ∃zA(P, z) is equivalent to the
set of all clauses in the Z-collapsed set of A that do not mention atoms in Z.
Proof. Since the Z-collapsed set of A is equivalent to A|Z| (Section 5.2), it is sufficient
to prove that ∃zA(P, z) is equivalent to the set of all clauses in A|Z| that do not mention
atoms in Z. The proof is by strong induction on the length of z. Assume that
∃zk−1, . . . , z1A(P, zk, zk−1, . . . , z1)
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Let’s denote the set by A′k−1(zk). Then ∃zk, . . . , z1A(P, zk, . . . , z1) is equivalent to
A′k−1() ∨ A′k−1(⊥), from which a conjunctive normal form can be obtained by distrib-
uting ∨ over ∧. Let’s denote the resulting set of clauses by Bk . One can check that Bk is
equivalent to the set of all clauses in Ak that do not mention atoms in zk, . . . , z1:
• Bk contains all clauses in A′k−1(zk) that do not mention zk .• Every other clause in Bk is entailed by a clause in A′k−1(zk) that does not mention zk
except for clauses C1 ∨C2 that are obtained by taking a disjunction of C1 ∨¬zk from
A′k−1() and C2 ∨ zk from A′k−1(⊥). 
A.4. Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2. Let A(P,Z) be a formula, and B a finite set of clauses equivalent to A(P,Z).
The following formulas are equivalent to each other.
(a) CIRC[A(P,Z);P ;Z].
(b) The conjunction of A(P,Z) and
∨
K ⊃ ∀z¬A(P, z)K⊥
for all subsets K of P .
(c) The conjunction of A(P,Z) and
∧
L ⊃ ∀z¬A(P, z)L⊥
for all generalized loops L of A(P,Z) on P under B with Z varied.
Proof. By Proposition 5, CIRC[A(P,Z);P ;Z] is equivalent to
A(P,Z) ∧ CIRC[∃zA(P, z);P ], (A.3)
and by Theorem 1(b), (A.3) is equivalent to the conjunction of A(P,Z) and
∨
K ⊃ ¬∃zA(P, z)K⊥
for all subsets K of P . By Theorem 1(c), (A.3) is also equivalent to the conjunction of
A(P,Z) and
∧
L ⊃ ¬∃zA(P, z)L⊥ (A.4)
for all generalized loops L of ∃zA(P, z) under (the clausal form of) ∃zB(P, z). By
Lemma 2, ∃zB(P, z) is equivalent to the set of all clauses in the Z-collapsed set of B that
do not mention atoms in Z, from which we get the generalized loops of A on P under B
with Z varied. 
A.5. Proof of Proposition 9
Given a disjunctive logic program Π without classical negation, by ΠK⊥ we denote the
program obtained from Π by replacing all occurrences of atoms from K that are not in the
scope of negation as failure with ⊥.
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∧
K ⊃ ¬ΠK⊥
for all nonempty sets K of atoms that occur in Π .14
The following proposition is from Corollary 6 of [15].
Proposition 12. For any finite disjunctive logic program Π without classical negation, a
set of atoms is an answer set for Π iff it is a model of T (Π).
Proof of Proposition 9. According to Corollary 4, CIRC[A;P ;Z] is equivalent to the
conjunction of A and
∧
K ⊃ ¬∃zA(P, z)K⊥ (A.5)
for all nonempty subsets K of P ; according to Proposition 12, T (ΠA;P ;Z) is equivalent to
the conjunction of ΠA;P ;Z and
∧
K ⊃ ¬(ΠA;P ;Z)K⊥ (A.6)
for all nonempty sets K of atoms from σA.
We will show that these two theories are equivalent to each other in propositional logic.
First it is easy to check that ΠA;P ;Z is equivalent to A in propositional logic. One can also
check that every formula (A.6) where K contains an atom from σA\P is a tautology due
to the presence of rules a; not a for a ∈ σA\P .
We will now show that under ΠA;P ;Z (or A) the set of formulas (A.5) for all nonempty
subsets K of P is equivalent to the set of formulas (A.6) for all nonempty subsets K
of P . It is sufficient to show that under the same assumption ∃zA(P, z)K⊥ is equivalent to
(ΠA;P ;Z)K⊥ for every nonempty subset K of P . It follows from Lemma 2 that ∃zA(P, z)K⊥
is equivalent to the conjunction of RP (C)K⊥ for all clauses C in AZ that do not mention
atoms in Z; for all rules r other than such RP (C)’s in ΠA;P ;Z , it is easy to check that rK⊥
is entailed by ΠA;P ;Z , so that ∃zA(P, z)K⊥ is equivalent to (ΠA;P ;Z)K⊥ as well. 
A.6. Proof of Proposition 11
Given a formula F and a consistent set K of literals, by FK we denote the formula
obtained from formula F by replacing all occurrences of atoms a in F by
• ⊥ if a ∈ K , and
•  if ¬a ∈ K .
Given a causal theory CT , by CTK we denote the theory obtained from CT by replacing
all rules F⇐G in CT with FK⇐G.
14 We identify a logic program with a propositional theory by identifying ‘not’ with ‘¬’, ‘,’ with ‘∧’, and ‘;’
with ‘∨’.
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∧
K ⊃ ¬CTK
for all nonempty sets K of literals from the signature of CT .15
Similarly to Proposition 12, the following proposition holds [14, Chapter 10.3, Theo-
rem 3]:
Proposition 13. Let CT be a finite causal theory whose signature is σ . An interpretation
of σ is a model of CT iff it is a model of T (CT).
Proof of Proposition 11. According to Corollary 4, CIRC[A;P ;Z] is equivalent to the
conjunction of A and
∧
K ⊃ ¬∃zA(P, z)K⊥ (A.7)
for all nonempty subsets K of P ; according to Proposition 13, T (CTA;P ;Z) is equivalent
to the conjunction of CTA;P ;Z and
∧
K ⊃ ¬(CTA;P ;Z)K (A.8)
for all nonempty sets K of literals from σA.
We will show that these two theories are equivalent to each other in propositional logic.
First CTA;P ;Z is equivalent to A in propositional logic. One can also check that every
formula (A.8) where K contains a negative literal l or a literal l from σA\P is a tautology
due to the presence of rules l⇐ l.
We will now show that under CTA;P ;Z (or A) the set of formulas (A.7) for all nonempty
subsets K of P is equivalent to the set of formulas (A.8) for all nonempty subsets K
of P . It is sufficient to show that under the same assumption ∃zA(P, z)K⊥ is equivalent to
(CTA;P ;Z)K for every nonempty subset K of P . It follows from Lemma 2 that ∃zA(P, z)K⊥
is equivalent to the conjunction of CRP (C)K for all clauses C in AZ that do not mention
atoms in Z; for all causal rules r other than such CRP (C)’s in CTA;P ;Z , it is easy to
check that rK is entailed by CTA;P ;Z , so that ∃zA(P, z)K⊥ is equivalent to (CTA;P ;Z)K as
well. 
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